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I. INTRODUCTION
The seizure of assets from illegal drug organizations is big
business for the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA'). In fact, there
have been years that total DEA seizures from drug trafficking
activities have amounted to larger quantities than the amount
allocated for its annual budget.' Many of these seizures were
made possible with the help of "cooperating informants," who are
private individuals, used by United States government agencies,
to supply information or provide assistance in ongoing investiga-
tions.2 In 1993, approximately $97,000,000 was paid to infor-
mants by various agencies of the United States.' This paper
explores the process of contracting between the United States and
1. Mary Thornton, DEA Seizures Surpass Its Budget, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1986 at
A5 (in 1986 alone, the DEA was seizing so many assets from drug trafficking
organizations that it was taking in more cash and property than the amount spent on
its annual budget which was $363,000,000).
2. See generally Mark Curriden, Secret Threat to Justice, NATL. L.J., Feb. 20,
1995 at Al.
3. Id. at A28.
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its informants, by summarizing a recent pattern of cases alleging
dishonored contract terms and the effect of such dishonor upon
the integrity of the United States as promisor in future interna-
tional transactions.
Part II of this case note examines the legal elements neces-
sary to bind the United States government in contract. Part III
illustrates how the DEA compensates its informants by analyzing
the statutory basis and procedure for authorizing payments to an
informant. Part IV details a case study addressing the commonal-
ity in claims against the United States as a promisor in contracts
with informants and theorizes as to the new policy of the United
States. Part V explores the international reach of the DEA and
some of the pitfalls associated therewith. Part VI concludes with
some recent solutions evidenced in case law as well as suggestions
for more practical solutions.
II. CONTRACTING WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
The United States Supreme Court has stated the risks associ-
ated with entering into contracts with the United States:
Anyone entering into an arrangement with the government
takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who
purports to act for the government stays within the bounds
of his authority. The scope of this authority may be explic-
itly defined by Congress or be limited by delegated legisla-
tion, properly exercised through rule making power. And
this is so even though.., the agent himself may have been
unaware of the limitations upon his authority.4
Entering into government contracts is a risky endeavor for
even the most cautious of parties. In cases where an approving
official exceeds his authority, the government can disavow the
official's words and will not be bound by an implied contract.' Fur-
thermore, the burden of proof with respect to contracting author-
ity of a government agent to bind the United States will always
fall upon the plaintiff.'
4. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947); See also Humlen v.
United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 497, 503 (2001); Toranzo-Claure v. United States, 48 Fed.
CL 581, 583 (2001); Doe v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 495, 501 (2000); Khairallah v.
United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 57, 63 (1999); Cruz-Pagan v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 59,
60 (1996); Roy v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 184, 187 (1997).
5. Empresas Electronicas Walser, Inc. v. United States, 223 Ct. Cl. 686, 688
(1980) (cited in New America Shipbuilders, Inc., v. United States, 871 F.2d 1077, 1080
(1989)); Cruz-Pagan, 35 Fed. Cl. 59, 63 (1996).
6. City of El Centro v. United States, 922 F.2d 816, 821 (2d Cir. 1990); Kania v.
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Mutuality of intent, consideration, and lack of ambiguity in
offer and acceptance are the elements required to form an express
or implied-in-fact contract.7 A fourth requirement is added when
the United States is a party: the government representative
"whose conduct is relied upon must have actual authority to bind
the government in contract."'
Unlike contracts between private parties, apparent authority
will not be sufficient to hold the government bound by the acts of
its agents.' Implied actual authority, however, like expressed
actual authority, will bind the Government. ° Authority to bind
the government will generally be implied when such authority is
considered to be an integral part of the duties assigned to a gov-
ernment employee."
In the case of DEA field agents, the DEA has repeatedly taken
the position that its agents lack authority to bind the government
in contract.'2 Even though agents are often expected to negotiate
agreements with informants, this function has not been inter-
preted as an "integral part" of a field agent's duties. The courts
have likewise held that it is not necessary, nor essential, for the
DEA to grant contracting authority to its field agents in order to
enable the agents to carry out their assigned duties of maintain-
ing contact and exercising control over informants.13 Therefore, a
contract claim based solely on implied actual authority not involv-
ing a high-level DEA official will normally be subject to summary
judgment on the grounds that the agent lacked the requisite
authority to bind the United States. 4
Ratification is another way of binding the United States in
United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 458 (1981); Howard v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 297, 312
(1994).
7. City of El Centro, 922 F.2d at 820; Fincke v. United States, 675 F.2d 289
(1982); Russell Corp. v. United States, 537 F. 2d 474 (1976). See also Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592 (1923).
8. Toranzo-Claure, 48 Fed. Cl. at 583; Juda v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 441, 452
(1984) (citing Federal Crop Ins. Corp, 332 U.S. 380); H. Landau & Company v. United
States, 886 F.2d 322, 324 (1989); H.F. Allen Orchards v. United States, 749 F.2d 1571,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
9. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 332 U.S. at 384; H. Landau & Company, 886 F.2d at
324.
10. H. Landau & Company, 886 F.2d at 324.
11. Id.
12. Henke v. United States, 60 F. 3d 795 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Toranzo-Claure, 48 Fed.
Cl. at 583 (2001).
13. Cruz-Pagan, 35 Fed. Cl. at 61; Khairallah v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 57, 63-
4 (1999); Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 502.
14. Toranzo-Claure, 48 Fed. Cl. at 581; Cruz-Pagan, 35 Fed. C1. at 60; Nagy
Khairallah, 43 Fed. C1. at 64.
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contract. The ratification of an unauthorized agreement by an
agent with actual authority will have the same effect as an initial
authorization."5 Proving ratification, however, can be very diffi-
cult. "Ratification requires that a superior official have authority
to ratify, knowledge of a subordinate's unauthorized act, and then
must confirm, adopt, or acquiesce to the unauthorized action of his
subordinate." 6 Thus, a plaintiff would need to produce evidence
that a superior, having actual authority, acted with full knowl-
edge, in such a manner as to manifest a "knowing acquiescence" to
the details of the agreement in question. 7
III. COMPENSATING COOPERATING INFORMANTS
OF THE DEA
The cooperating agreements of the DEA and FBI illustrate
the government's policy with regard to promises of payment to
informants. 8 The DEA's policies, in particular, deserve a closer
look, due to the numerous cases recently filed in Federal Claims
Court regarding alleged false oral promises made by DEA agents
to informants.
According to Doe v. United States, confidential informants can
receive monetary compensation under two different schemes. 9
Payments can be made from the general appropriations fund or
the Attorney General may grant an award from the Asset Forfei-
ture Fund.2"
A. General Appropriations Fund
With respect to payments from the general appropriations
fund, the court in Doe v. United States explains the operation of
authorizing payments according to Section 6612.61(D) of the cur-
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 100 & cmt. a (1958); IRS v. Gaster,
42 F.3d 787, 793 (1994); BE&K Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 23 F.3d 1459,
1466 (1994).
16. Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 504; California Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. United States, 22 Cl.
Ct. 19, 27-28 (1990), affd, 937 F.2d 624 (Fed. Cir. 1991); United States v. Beebe, 180
U.S. 343, 354 (1901).
17. Humlen, 49 Fed. Cl. at 504; Khairallah, 43 Fed. Cl. 64; Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 504;
Henke, 43 Fed. Cl. 37.
18. Other agencies of the United States government known to have policies and
procedures with regard to payment include the Federal Bureau of Investigations,
United States Customs Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, and the
Internal Revenue Service.
19. Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 497.
20. Id.
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rent DEA Agent's Manual:21
Payments less than [text redacted] may be approved by the
immediate supervisor of a field agent; payments between
[text redacted] and [text redacted] may only be approved by
an authorized senior field manager, GS-1811-15, or higher;
and a single payment in excess of [text redacted] requires
the additional approval of the Special Agent in Charge or
Country Attache, and the Chief of Domestic Operations or
the Chief of International Operations as appropriate.22
The older version of the DEA Agent's Manual in effect from
February 1988 until September 10, 1998 contained fewer levels of
authorization.2" The present version of the DEA Agent's Manual,
in comparison, has added an additional monetary range to the
older structure and has expanded the number of DEA Agents that
have explicit authority to approve payments from the general
appropriations fund.24 Thus, to be an agent with explicit authority
to approve payments, such a person must be one of the following:
(1) an immediate supervisor of a field agent, (2) an authorized
senior field manager, GS-1811-15 or higher, or (3) a Special Agent
in Charge or Country Attache, and the Chief of Domestic Opera-
tions or the Chief of International Operations as appropriate. 5
B. Asset Forfeiture Fund
With respect to payments from the Asset Forfeiture Fund, the
court in Doe v. United States also explains the operation of author-
izing payments according to Section 6612.67(1) of the current
DEA Manual:26
Confidential sources have no inherent "entitlement" to
receive payment from the Asset Forfeiture Fund, regard-
less of the extent of, or fruits of their cooperation. The final
decision as to whether and how much to pay a confidential
source from the Asset Forfeiture Fund rests with Head-
quarters, and will depend on the availability of funds at the
21. Id.
22. Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 498; See also DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, DEA AGENTS
MANUAL Chapter 66, Subchapter 6612.61(D) (2001).
23. According to Section 6612.43(B) (1998) of the DEA Agent's Manual, the Special
Agent in Charge or Country Attache is authorized to approve payments up to [text
redacted]. Payments beyond [text redacted] must be approved by the Deputy
Assistant Administrator for Operations. Id.
24. Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 498. See also DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, supra note 22.
25. Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 498. See also DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, supra note 22.
26. Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 497.
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time the application is processed, as well as other factors.
27
Thus, DEA agents can only recommend that an award, in an
unknown amount, be made to a confidential informant.
The prior DEA Agent's Manual in effect from February 1988
until September 10, 1998 still listed the positions delegated with
authority to approve awards.2" Under Section 6612.44(C)(2) of the
DEA Agent's Manual:
Offices must not promise awards in any amount to an indi-
vidual. The statutory authority29 provides that the pay-
ment of such awards is purely discretionary. Moreover the
authority to grant an award of less than [text redacted]
from the Asset Forfeiture Fund was delegated to and was
within the discretion of the Deputy Assistant Director for
Operations of the DEA. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(2),
the authority to approve an Asset Forfeiture Fund award of
$250,000 or more was delegated by the Attorney General
only to the DEA Administrator, and could not be re-
delegated."3
The more recent version of the DEA Agent's Manual departs
from a clear structure and adopts a newer version that is subject
to varying interpretations. Under Section 6612.67(1), an inform-
ant will have no entitlement to receive payment. If, however, pay-
ment is promised, the decision to honor such a promise will be
dependent upon approval by so-called Headquarters,"' which can
only disburse funds subject to availability and can depend on a
mysterious third prong: "other factors."
32
C. Cooperation Agreement
A cooperating informant is usually asked to sign a coopera-
27. Id.; See also DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, supra note 22, at Subchapter
6612.67 (1) (2001).
28. Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 497. See also DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, supra note 22,
at Subchapter 6612.44(C)(2) (1998).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 524(c) (2001).
30. DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, supra note 22, at Subchapter 6612.44(C)(2)
(1998).
31. The term "Headquarters" is not currently listed on the DEA organizational
chart as a division, section or office. See http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/briefingbook/page5.
htm.
32. DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, supra note 22, at Subchapter 6612. "Other
factors" remains undefined and is subject only to the limitations and discretion of the
participating agent's principles.
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tion agreement.3 Cooperation agreements are forms that outline
the conditions that confidential informants agree to follow when
furnishing information and assistance to the DEA.3 4 A coopera-
tion agreement will usually state clauses stipulating that the
informant must not violate any laws in furtherance of his assign-
ment, that the informant has no official status with the DEA, that
confidentiality cannot be guaranteed, and that the informant may
be called to testify. The cases, however, indicate that the form is
often silent with respect to compensation of cooperating infor-
mants and that actual written agreements addressing compensa-
tion are not usually completed. The most common claim
regarding cooperation agreements is that particular DEA agents
made oral promises of compensation during the signing of their
respective cooperating agreements.3 7
D. Claims under Section 52411
The majority of breach of contract claims against the DEA
stem from misinterpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 524(c). Section 524
establishes the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Fund dis-
cussed above. This United States Treasury special fund is availa-
ble to the Attorney General without fiscal year limitation for
certain enumerated purposes. 9 One such purpose is "the payment
of awards for information or assistance directly relating to viola-
tions of the criminal drug laws of the United States". ° Another
such purpose is for "the payment of awards for information or
assistance leading to a civil or criminal forfeiture involving any
federal agency participating in the Fund".4'
The Court of Federal Claims, however, has repeatedly held
that section 524 is not a money mandating statute and therefore
33. See DEA Form 473 (on file with the University of Miami Inter-American Law
Review).
34. Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 498.
35. See Khairallah, 43 Fed. C1. at 59.
36. There are no cases involving informants whereby an informant or the DEA has
produced written agreements outlining compensation. Oral promises are usually
utilized until a request form outlining compensation is completed after a seizure or
upon the need of an informant's testimony or further assistance.
37. Cru2-Pagan, 35 Fed. Cl. at 59; Salles v. United States, 156 F.3d 1383 (1998);
Khairallah, 43 Fed. Cl. at 57; Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 495; Toranzo-Claure, 48 Fed. Cl. at
581.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 524 (2001).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1)(B).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1)(C).
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cannot form the basis of a claim of breach. 42 The reward for infor-
mation and assistance that is offered by section 524 is totally dis-
cretionary and cannot take place before the fact of seizure.
"Forfeiture for the purpose of determining whether to make an
award cannot take place until after the forfeiture is complete."44
Therefore, allegations of any agreements made regarding awards
prior to seizure or forfeiture will not entitle any informant to a
claim.
In Khairallah v. United States, Harold D. Wankel, the Deputy
Assistant Administrator of the DEA, describes the procedure as
being initiated by the submission of a "memorandum recom-
mending an amount of award no greater than one fourth of the net
amount realized by the United States from the drug-related for-
feitures, or a dollar amount up to $250,000."Il Recent cases, how-
ever, allege that DEA Agents have been making offers of twenty-
five percent without placing any limitation on the computation of
forfeitures made in relation to an informant's information.4"
This inconsistency may be the result of DEA Agents promis-
ing an award of twenty-five percent when they should really be
saying that they promise to recommend an award of twenty-five
percent. The agent may also be making promises of an up to
twenty-five percent award when the informant is mistakenly
hearing and agreeing to a full twenty-five percent figure. Any
confusion on the informant's part is, however, irrelevant. We now
know that agreeing in advance to particular awards is impermis-
sible under Section 524 and regardless of permissibility, the DEA
Agent's Manual47 makes clear that there is no inherent entitle-
ment to payment from the Asset Forfeiture Fund.
Therefore, the only reasonable expectation for an informant to
recover an award or payment will rely heavily upon a memoran-
dum recommending the award prepared by the supervising
agent.' This memorandum will be subject to the approval of a
42. Khairallah, 43 Fed. C1. at 61; See also Hoch v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 39, 44
(1995) (Section 524 not money mandating).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 524 (c)(1)(A) & (C) (payments from the Asset Forfeiture Fund for
expenses or awards are made at the discretion of the Attorney General).
44. Khairallah, 43 Fed. Cl. at 62.
45. Id.
46. Cruz-Pagan, 35 Fed. Cl. at 59; Salles, 156 F.3d at 1383; Khairallah, 43 Fed. Cl.
at 57; Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 495.
47. DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, supra note 22, at Subchapter 6612.67(1).
48. Khairallah, 43 Fed. Cl. at 62 ("The procedure is initiated by the submission of
a memorandum, or appropriate DEA form, from the Special Agent in charge of the
requesting field office of the DEA. This memorandum sets forth relevant information
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higher-ranking officer that may or may not be familiar with the
case.49 Lastly, if the memorandum proves unconvincing or there
are insufficient funds available, then the informant is left with no
payment unless he can prove that he was authorized for payment
from a different fund, such as the general appropriations fund.
IV. THE No AUTHORITY RUNAROUND AND RECENT
COMMONALITY IN CLAIMS
In the period between 1996 and 2001, there have been at least
seven 50 similar breaches of contract actions brought against the
United States Government in the Court of Federal Claims.5 ' In
each case, the defendant claimed that several United States offi-
cials offered compensation of up to twenty-five percent of the total
seizures made from that informant's information.5' These alleged
oral promises were usually made in the presence of several other
agents, during the signing of cooperation agreements. 3 The coop-
eration agreements were usually witnessed and also signed by
such agents.' In all of the cases where the government eventually
offered compensation, there was either no payment or an amount
significantly lower than the orally agreed amount.5 5 These
breaches in the alleged agreements were upheld due to a lack of
actual or implied-actual contracting authority on the part of the
government agents .5  Detailed chronologies of the seven cases
pertaining to the award request, including the extent and significance of the
cooperation.").
49. Id. (The memorandum is submitted by the Specal Agent in charge of the
requesting field office of the DEA. Then, "the request is reviewed within my office
[Deputy Assistant Administrator] for approval, denial, or modification.").
50. Cruz-Pagan, 35 Fed. Cl. at 59; Roy, 38 Fed. Cl. at 184; Salles, 156 F.3d at
1383; Khairallah, 43 Fed. Cl. at 57; Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 495; Toranzo-Claure, 48 Fed.
Cl. at 581; Humlen, 49 Fed. Cl. at 497.
51. The Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over cases sounding in
contract against the United States where the damages sought exceed $10,000.00.
52. Cruz-Pagan, 35 Fed. Cl. at 60; Roy, 38 Fed. Cl. at 186; Salles, 156 F.3d at
1383; Khairallah, 43 Fed. CI. at 58; Doe, 48 Fed. CI. at 498; Toranzo-Claure, 48 Fed.
Cl. at 582; Humlen, 49 Fed. Cl. at 500.
53. Salles, 156 F.3d at 1384; Khairallah, 43 Fed. Cl. at 60; Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 498;
Humlen, 49 Fed. Cl. at 500.
54. Khairallah, 43 Fed. Cl. at 60; Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 498; Humlen, 49 Fed. Cl. at
500.
55. Cruz-Pagan, 35 Fed. Cl. at 60; Roy, 38 Fed. Cl. at 191; Salles, 156 F.3d at
1384; Khairallah, 43 Fed. C1. at 59; Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 499; Toranzo-Claure, 48 Fed.
Cl. at 583; Humlen, 49 Fed. Cl. at 501.
56. Cruz-Pagan, 35 Fed. Cl. at 63; Roy, 38 Fed. Cl. at 191; Salles, 156 F.3d at
1384; Khairallah, 43 Fed. Cl. at 63; Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 503; Toranzo-Claure, 48 Fed.
Cl. at 583; Humlen, 49 Fed. Cl. at 504.
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brought against the United States are discussed below.
A. The No Authority Runaround
In Cruz-Pagan v. United States, an informant sought to
recover $225,250 from the United States Department of Justice 7
for assistance and information leading to the forfeiture of
$901,000 in cashier's checks. 8 The informant claimed that he
entered an enforceable contract with the DEA, agreeing that he
would receive twenty-five percent of the value of any property
seized and forfeited as a result of his assistance. 9 The DEA, how-
ever, recommended that the plaintiff receive a $100,000 award for
his assistance, but later withdrew its recommendation when the
plaintiff was indicted for other crimes. 0
The plaintiff argued that contracting authority was an "inte-
gral part of the duties assigned" to DEA agents because con-
tracting authority was necessary and essential to the performance
of their assigned duties of maintaining contact and exercising con-
trol over informants."' The United States Court of Federal
Claims, however, ruled that "because reasonably efficient alterna-
tives appear to exist to create the desired expectation of compen-
sation, it would not be necessary for [the] DEA to grant
contracting authority to its agents" and, thus, the prerequisites
for implied-actual authority did not exist."2 An alternative ground
for denying implied actual authority was also offered. "The doc-
trine of implied actual authority cannot be used to create an
agent's actual authority to bind the government in contract when
the agency's internal procedures specifically preclude that agent
from exercising such authority."63
In Roy v. United States, the plaintiff alleged that FBI agents
promised him up to twenty-five percent of any related forfeitures,
or $250,000, whichever amount was less.' For the next four
years, the informant ran a sting operation and helped accumulate
57. Cruz-Pagan, 35 Fed. Cl. at 59 (the claim is made against the DEA, which is a
subdivision of the United States Department of Justice).
58. Cruz-Pagan, 35 Fed. Cl. at 60.
59. Id.
60. Id. A $100,000 award would yield an approximate nine percent of the seizure
of the cashier's checks.
61. Id. at 61.
62. Id. at 61-62.
63. Id. at 61-62.
64. Roy, 38 Fed. Cl. at 186.
260
CONTRACTS WITH INFORMANTS
substantial audio and video evidence for the FBI. 5 This evidence
enabled the FBI to identify, infiltrate, and destroy some of the
largest drug rings in Philadelphia.6 In exchange for his inform-
ant tasks, the plaintiffs mandatory five-year jail term was
reduced to five years of probation.67 He also received $84,428 for
expenses incurred during informant activities and a lump sum of
$100,000 for his informant services. Although the parties disa-
gree over the value of the forfeited assets69, the Court of Federal
Claims still held that because the agreement was for an amount
"up to twenty-five percent of plaintiffs claim", then the total
amount seized was not in issue as long as the FBI gave the plain-
tiff some money.7" In other words, the $100,000 figure was suffi-
cient because it could fall within the range that encompassed an
amount "up to twenty-five percent." Applying this reasoning, a
fortiori, the FBI could have also paid the informant a one-dollar
figure and have still remained true to the contract's terms.
Similarly in Humlen v. United States, the informant alleged
he was promised twenty-five percent of any money recovered from
property or money forfeiture, $500 per kilogram of cocaine seized,
and a lump-sum award of up to $250,000 at the conclusion of the
investigation.7 The cooperation agreement signed by the inform-
ant in this case, however, contained a clause that had not been
mentioned in any of the prior cases dealing with such agree-
ments. 2 This cooperation agreement contained an integration
clause stating that any "modifications to this agreement will have
no force and effect unless and until such modifications are reduced
to writing and signed by all parties thereto."73 Upon reading the
agreement, the plaintiff asked why the written contract terms dif-
fered from those of the oral promises.74 The response and explana-
tion of the agents was that the agreement had to be "couched" in
65. Id. at 185.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 185-186.
68. Id. at 186.
69. The values submitted for the total forfeited assets that the plaintiffs
assistance helped obtain were a sum of $1,820,000 for the FBI and $5,000,000 for the
plaintiff. A lump sum of $100,000 award, compared to an asset seizure of $1,820,000
and $5,000,000, amounts to 5.5% and 0.02% of the amount seized, respectively. Id. at
186.
70. Id. at 191.
71. Humlen, 49 Fed. Cl. at 500.
72. Id. at 501.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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that way because it was a discoverable document. 5
Although the total amount seized76 as a result of the informa-
tion from the informant was in dispute, the plaintiff eventually
received a $5000 disbursement, a monthly compensation of $2000
for expenses, and a $50,000 lump sum for informant services."
On the issue of breach of contract, the Court held that the
promises were unenforceable as a matter of law because none of
the agents listed in the complaint had the requisite actual author-
ity to bind the government in contract."8 Additionally, the court
noted that "even if the Special Agents did have the requisite
authority to contractually bind the government, [the] plaintiffs'
claims are barred by the agreement's integration clause."79
In Salles v. United States, the plaintiff contends that she was
orally promised a twenty-five percent commission on the value of
all the money and property seized as a result of her assistance and
information.80 On appeal from summary judgment for the govern-
ment, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that
none of the employees had implied actual authority to bind the
United States.81 One dissenting judge, however, found this case
"troubling" and maintained that when parties have mutually
assented to be bound, the written document itself need not be a
fully integrated contract in order to memorialize that some kind of
agreement was made. 2
The complete disclaimer by the United States of any under-
standing or obligation whatsoever is what troubles me most
about this case. The position of the Department of Justice
that there was no agreement, and that in all events an
agreement on percentage terms is not enforceable because
the informant's work turned out to produce very large mon-
etary returns to the United States, does scant credit to the
nation. The integrity of the United States as a promisor is
75. Id.
76. Plaintiff claims his information led to the seizure of 428 kilograms of cocaine
and the eventual forfeiture of $754,000, a residence, and four vehicles. The
government maintains that the information led to the seizure of over 230 kilograms of
cocaine and approximately $50,000. If the contract terms were enforced, a seizure of
230 kilograms of cocaine alone, at a reward of $500 per kilogram would yield $115,000
irrespective of the other assets seized. Id. at 501.
77. Id. at 501-02.
78. Id. at 504.
79. Id. at 506.
80. Salles, 156 F. 3d at 1383.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1384.
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not less stringent when dealing with informants . 3
Although the case neglected to mention the amount of the forfei-
ture, it is apparent from the above-quoted dissent that large mon-
etary figures were at stake and played at least some role in the
court's decision.
During oral argument, counsel for the government conceded
that some persons in the DEA have authority to promise compen-
sation in percentage terms, but countered by conditioning that
such arrangements were extraordinary and available only at the
highest level of the Department of Justice.8 4 The dissent, how-
ever, found such a contention to be uneasily reconciled with the
document evidence of apparently routine DEA forms that con-
tained a line item for "recommended percentage." 5 Judge New-
man clarified, "I doubt that the federal agents who deal with
confidential informants are required to personally have monetary
authority as contracting officers, in order to have authority to
promise a percentage of the illegal proceeds recovered due to the
informant's services." 6
In Khairallah v. United States, the plaintiff was offered as
payment for his expenses, $5000 per kilogram of heroin, $100 a
day, and a reward of twenty-five percent of the value of assets
recovered.87 The distinguishing factor in this case was that the
informant had grown accustomed to being consistently paid in
accordance with the above payment scheme.88 The DEA never dis-
puted that the plaintiff worked on numerous cases and that with
the exception of the three cases that formed the basis of this
action, it "always paid plaintiff the way he asserts." 9 Upon trans-
fer, however, from the Detroit office to the New York Field Divi-
sion office, the agreement began to deteriorate. The New York
agents again promised him a salary of $3100 per month, $1000 a
week for expenses, $5000 per kilogram of heroin, $1000 per kilo-
gram of cocaine, and twenty-five percent of all cash seized."
The informant claimed non-payment on two investigations
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1385 n.2 ("This is illustrated by a document in the record, showing a
monetary award to this appellant, on a form which contains the following line: C.
Recommended Percentage: N/A").
86. Id. at 1385.
87. Khairallah, 43 Fed. Cl. at 58.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 59.
90. Id. at 58-59.
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and a remaining fifteen percent on a third investigation where
only a ten percent reward was granted2 Twelve DEA Agents
were identified by the plaintiff as having entered into an express
agreement that was allegedly ratified by an additional two high-
ranking agents." All in all, there were fourteen agents, one of
whom was a Special Agent in Charge and another who was an
Assistant Administrator for Operations." In response, the DEA
asserted that none of the fourteen agents with whom the plaintiff
had any direct contact had authority to enter into the type of con-
tract plaintiff alleges; or, in the alternative, that no one with suffi-
cient contracting authority ever ratified the necessary contract
terms.94
The question left unanswered, then, was how Khairallah had
been paid consistently in the past, before and after these investi-
gations, if there was no authorization made for the payments?
The affidavit of James M. Whetstone, Deputy Assistant Adminis-
trator for the Office of Acquisition Management, was used to
describe the process for obtaining payments.95 In fact, it was his
affidavit that was used by the court to find an absence of genuine
issue of material fact regarding the contracting authority of the
fourteen agents:
Whetstone states that a delegation of procurement author-
ity from either Whetstone or his predecessors is required
for a DEA employee to enter into a contract with any non-
government contractor, vendor, or other individual. None
of these agents with whom plaintiff alleged he negotiated
had ever been delegated procurement authority. 7
Whetstone's affidavit still leaves one glaring inconsistency.
Under what procedure did Khairallah get paid for all of the other
contracts that are not currently in dispute?" How and why are
91. Id. at 59 ("In 1987, the plaintiff worked on an investigation... [that] resulted
in the seizure of five pounds of cocaine and $53,000. Plaintiff did not receive a reward
from this investigation. Also in 1987, plaintiff worked on an investigation ... [that]
resulted in the seizure of one pound of cocaine and $73,000. Again, plaintiff did not
receive a reward from this seizure. In 1988, plaintiff worked on an investigation..
[that] resulted in the seizure of 113 pounds of cocaine and $480,000. Plaintiff received
ten percent reward from this seizure.").
92. Id. at 60.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 62.
96. Id. at 61.
97. Id. at 60.
98. Id. at 59. (The record indicates that the informant was paid consistently in the
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they subject to different treatment than the litigated matter? If
the requisite authority approved the prior paid contracts, then
why was there no analysis distinguishing one contract from the
others at issue? This discrepancy begs the question of whether
contract authorization is only a technicality asserted for litigation
purposes and not an actual DEA customary practice.99
In Doe v. United States, the plaintiff claims he was offered
between ten to twenty-five percent of the value of any seizures
resulting from his cooperation.' ° He claimed to be owed in excess
of $600,000 for his participation in three investigations. 1' In one
of the three investigations, a DEA Agent did actually recommend
an award of 12.5% of the value of any property seized. 102 That rec-
ommendation, however, was withdrawn upon the informant's fail-
ure to submit to a polygraph examination. 3
In court, upon a showing that the contracting agents lacked
the requisite contracting authority, the plaintiff argued that "the
government 'had a custom of allowing its agents to enter [into]
contracts' shown by the past dealings of the DEA with the plain-
tiff, his father, and other confidential informants." 4 The United
States Court of Federal Claims, in response, held that the plain-
tiffs prior experience with the DEA was not sufficient as proof
with respect to the contract at issue, and that the plaintiff did not
meet his burden of proving that any of the agents had the requi-
site contracting authority."5
In Toranzo-Claure v. United States, the plaintiff sought
$75,000 for his informant services and expenses incurred.' 6 The
United States Court of Federal Claims noted that the monetary
amount claimed by the plaintiff was improbable in light of the
short nine-month period of service, as well as the apparent lack of
manner that he asserts. There is no indication, however, that the other contracts that
were honored were subject to similar legal scrutiny).
99. See SaUes, 156 F.3d at 1385 (wherein Judge Newman states in his dissenting
opinion) ("I doubt that federal agents who deal with confidential informants are
required to personally have monetary authority as contracting officers, in order to
have authority to promise a percentage of the illegal proceeds recovered due to the
informant's services.").
100. Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 498,
101. Id. at 497.
102. Id. at 499.
103. Id. (Informant was asked to submit to a polygraph examination with regard to
allegations of "unsatisfactory/unlawful conduct.").
104. Id. at 504.
105. Id.
106. Toranzo-Claure, 48 Fed.Cl. at 581.
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any specificity in describing the purported contracts.' The case
was ultimately decided on the grounds that the written agree-
ments did not require any such payments and that the defendant's
agents lacked the required contracting authority.1"8
B. New United States Policy on Informant Contracts?
The occurrence of seven cases within the last six years involv-
ing government agents following almost exact protocol demon-
strates a disturbing trend.0 9 Perhaps more shocking is the fact
that the cases do not indicate any signs of a forthcoming cure.
Rather, an increase in the frequency of these cases indicates that
the repercussions for making unauthorized promises to infor-
mants must not be severe enough to deter further violations. It
seems the United States agencies are simply not taking any active
steps towards preventing future violations. More troubling still
are the many opinions from the Federal Claims Court that evi-
dence the lack of disdain for this pattern of troubling behavior.
The agencies of the United States government that deal with
informants often correlate the success of their agents, to a great
extent, upon the number of cases and the amount of property
seizures made."0 The faster an agent can establish his reputation
as an effective agent, the faster a promotion will be in line."' The
use of informants will often times offer the quickest and most
effective track for infiltrating and closing-in on illegal operations
and organizations.'12
These agencies are also aware that agents will need to prom-
ise their informants either reduced prison sentences or substan-
tial monetary compensation to get them to risk their lives.
Therefore, it is clear that these agents will be entering into some
form of an agreement that deals with a method of compensation.
This authority to negotiate payment terms creates an incentive for
agents to exaggerate these awards and payments. The obvious
107. Id. at 583.
108. Id. at 583-584.
109. Cruz-Pagan, 35 Fed. Cl. at 59; Roy, 38 Fed. Cl. 184; Salles, 156 F.3d at 1383;
Khairallah, 43 Fed. Cl. at 57; Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 495; Toranzo-Claure, 48 Fed. Cl. at
581; Humlen, 49 Fed. Cl. 497.
110. Curriden, supra note 2 at A30 (statement of E. Michael McCann) ("The more
cases you make, the faster you get a promotion.").
111. Id.
112. Id. (statement of E. Michael McCann) ("Let's make no mistake; the system
operates on numbers. The more cases you make, the faster you get a promotion, and
informants are the fastest way for a detective to make lots of cases.").
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inquiry that remains is why the agencies do not simply produce
and implement procedures, whereby legitimate written contracts
are always required for agreements between agents and cooperat-
ing informants.
A policy that overlooks the possibility of government agents
having the ability to make oral assurances and then dishonoring
them at-will is not only unethical, but also impractical. A
decreased willingness to cooperate on the part of informants can
have a damaging effect upon law enforcement agencies."' In an
age of increased accessibility to information and news, it is risky
to assume that non-enforcement of informant contracts will
remain hidden from the knowledge of the underworld.
Although large amounts of money will often be involved, the
value that an informant brings to large-scale illegal investigations
is often immeasurable. The effectiveness of law enforcement
would certainly diminish without the aid of cooperating infor-
mants." 4 It is, therefore, essential to maintain a healthy rapport
with informants in order to continue to efficiently battle evolving
forms of organized crime.
The current rules and policies simply are not encouraging
agents to make truthful compensation disclosures to informants.
Assuming, arguendo, that the policies currently encourage frank
disclosure, is it practical and beneficial for these agencies to
assume that their agents will make promises within their means?
With no policy requiring routine forms to be completed with
regard to compensation, the courts are left to rely upon the verac-
ity of the supervising agents. Without stronger sanctions and
reforms there is little preventing DEA agents from exploiting this
unintentional, yet dangerous, loophole.
V. THE DEA AND INTERNATIONAL REACH?
The DEA website boasts that the DEA maintains seventy-
113. Id. ("The National Law Journal surveyed search warrants filed in federal
courts in Atlanta, Boston, Cleveland, and San Diego in 1980, 1988, and 1993 ...
practically all warrants now rely on information from confidential informants in some
manner. In 1980, forty-six percent of the warrants cited an informant's word; in 1993,
ninety-two percent of them did.").
114. See generally Curriden, supra note 2 (explaining that the ability to obtain
warrants would greatly diminish without the aid of informants. Lack of informant
cooperation would require law enforcement to seek out other forms of requisite
evidence to establish the basis for obtaining a warrant).
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eight offices in fifty-six countries throughout the world.11 This
international presence is needed to combat the constant flow of
illegal drugs into the United States. Indeed, fighting the war on
drugs solely at home and ignoring the foreign importation prob-
lem would be ignoring the source of the problem and would prove
to be a fruitless effort.
Of the five cases 116 discussed thus far concerning DEA Agents
exceeding the scope of their authority, at least..7 two cases have
dealt with informants either contacted abroad or working
abroad."' In Khairallah v. United States, the informant made ini-
tial contact with DEA Agents in Toronto, Canada while working
as an informant for the Royal Canadian Mountain Police. '19 Simi-
larly, in Toranzo-Claure v. United States, the informant worked
for the DEA in Bolivia from 1983 to 1991.20 How many other
cases have gone unrecorded is unknown, but it is probably safe to
assume that the average foreign informant does not have the
resources needed to bring a suit against the United States.
Whether the informant's reasons are financial inability, lack of
"know-how," or concern for safety, the likelihood of contesting a
foreign cooperation agreement will be unlikely.
The role of the DEA has, however, expanded beyond mere
domestic operations into a full-scale international effort with
offices in fifty-six countries throughout the world. At these offices,
the DEA surely works closely with local government and law
enforcement officials from many different countries. In their
capacities, these agents, for all practical purposes, represent the
United States of America and the policies of the United States
government with regard to law enforcement. We trust that these
agents are acting in a legal, good faith-based, and principled
manner.
On many of these foreign assignments, the DEA uses infor-
mants to effectively infiltrate many of the local drug conspiracies
that support the larger supply channels that flow to the United
115. See DEA Website, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/foreign.htm (last visited
May 15, 2002).
116. Cruz-Pagan, 35 Fed. Cl. at 59; Salles, 156 F.3d at 1383; Khairallah, 43 Fed. Cl.
at 57; Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 495; Toranzo-Claure, 48 Fed. Cl. at 581.
117. The term "at least" is used to illustrate that the Cruz-Pagan and Salles cases
failed to discuss where the informants were contacted or the location of any work
performed.
118. Khairallah, 43 Fed. Cl. at 58; Toranzo-Claure, 48 Fed. Cl. at 582.
119. Khairallah, 43 Fed. Cl. at 58.
120. Toranzo-Claure, 48 Fed. Cl. at 582.
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States. Cooperating informants, with the expectation of financial
compensation, often work for the DEA relying on oral and written
agreements reached with supervising DEA Agents. Whether
these agents are actually authorized to enter into these agree-
ments and the kinds of representations they are making are
issues that should warrant concern.
The recent pattern of cases emanating from the United States
Court of Federal Claims have consistently denied the right to pay-
ment for contracts made by DEA officials lacking in actual or
implied authority to contract.1 ' Unscrupulous and overzealous
agents, on foreign assignment, could easily exploit these prece-
dents. Domestically, "persons who cooperate in criminal investi-
gations typically deal with the investigating agents and not their
superiors, and may often be unaware of what level of authority is
required to commit the government to contractual undertak-
ings. '1 22 If within the domestic arena an informant is unlikely to
be aware of levels of authority, then the lack of awareness in an
international arena is surely greater.
Any foreigner would expect oral agreements made and wit-
nessed by U.S. DEA Agents to be honored. The United States
Supreme Court has held, however, that "anyone entering into an
arrangement with the government takes the risk of having accu-
rately ascertained that he who purports to act for the government
stays within the bounds of his authority."' Unfortunately, the
likelihood of a foreign informant being able to accurately ascertain
the authority of a supervising agent is highly doubtful. In fact,
many would balk at the idea that the United States government
would be willing to allow people to risk their lives over bogus
awards and contracts concocted by unprincipled DEA Agents.
VI. Do RECENT CHANGES OFFER A VIABLE SOLUTION?
The drafting of new clauses into cooperating agreement
forms, as evidenced by two recent cases, indicates at least some
change, albeit minor change.1 " These clauses will protect against
future lawsuits alleging breach of unauthorized promises. For
example, clauses that address the scope of agent discretion and
121. Cruz-Pagan, 35 Fed. Cl. at 59; Roy, 38 Fed. Cl. 184; Salles, 156 F.3d at 1383;
Khairallah, 43 Fed. Cl. at 57; Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 495; Toranzo.Claure, 48 Fed. Cl. at
581; Humlen, 49 Fed. Cl. at 497.
122. Sommers Oil Co. v. United States, 241 F.3d 1375, 1380-81 (2001).
123. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 332 U.S. at 384.
124. Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 495; Humlen, 49 Fed. Cl. at 497.
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disclaimers regarding promises of a sum-certain would certainly
reduce the amount of claims filed by informants. It remains
unclear, however, whether these modifications encourage change
in the misconduct of agents or if they simply make the contracts
more conscionable to the courts.
A clause stating that no sum-certain can be guaranteed by a
government agent might clear up future misunderstandings and
would be difficult to overlook. In Doe v. United States, upon an
informant's reactivation, he was asked to sign a second coopera-
tion agreement that stated: "[tihe amount of any payments paid to
me by [the] DEA for my cooperation shall be at the discretion of
[the] DEA, and no sum-certain can be guaranteed by any officer or
employee thereof."12 Certainly this clause would put a reasonable
person on notice that their compensation is based solely at the dis-
cretion of the DEA, and that there is a possibility of nonpayment.
This clause does not, however, clarify the nuances that a recom-
mendation from a field agent will normally entail. A better clause
might also explain that final discretion is likely to be exercised by
a higher-ranking DEA official other than the agent currently
being dealt with.'26 Furthermore, such higher-ranking agents
have the discretion to be unfamiliar or unsympathetic to the
informant's particular case on an at-will basis.
Clauses stating that payment will be discretionary and that
any oral modifications to the written agreement will have no effect
would be the most prudent modifications to existing cooperation
agreement forms. In Humlen v. United States, the FBI chose to
address the scope of its agreement by expressly stating, "Itlhis
document constitutes the full and complete agreement between
Humlen and the FBI. Modifications to this agreement will have
no force and effect unless and until such modifications are reduced
to writing and signed by all parties thereto."'1 27 In response to this
clause, the court held that the plaintiffs claims to enforce addi-
tional oral compensation "directly collides" with the plain lan-
guage of the agreement. 2 '
The use of integration clauses can greatly reduce the amount
of claims against the government by informants, but will not
125. Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 498.
126. See Khairallah, 43 Fed. Cl. at 62 (the office of the Deputy Assistant
Administrator reviews memorandum requests for award payments and determines
their approval, denial, or modification).
127. Humlen, 49 Fed. Cl. at 501.
128. Id. at 506.
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always prove successful in preventing agent misconduct.129 For
example, the plaintiff in Humlen v. United States, asserts that
when the agreement was presented for his signature, he asked
why the written contract differed from the oral promises made.130
"In response, the agents allegedly explained that the agreement
had to be 'couched' in that way because it was a discoverable docu-
ment ... and thus could be used to discredit plaintiffs reliability
and credibility." 3 ' To no avail, the plaintiff maintained that the
agents assured him that despite the wording of the contract, he
would receive his promised compensation.132
These recent modifications offer a solution only to the cau-
tious and untrusting reader of these agreements. Signed coopera-
tion agreements claiming that a supervising agent is only
authorized to make recommendations, and that such recommen-
dations are subject to the discretion of authorized agents, would
certainly diminish the amount of claims alleging oral promises to
informants. Perhaps an even stronger measure would be to man-
date agents with contracting authority to complete a written form
with the informant detailing the compensation arrangement that
has been agreed upon. At a minimum, the informant should be
asked to sign a disclaimer statement attesting that the informant
is aware that any oral promises will be deemed irrelevant and
that there is the possibility of nonpayment. Preventive drafting of
this nature removes any appearance of impropriety from govern-
ment agencies and should be considered in order to allow infor-
mants to make informed decisions regarding the risks associated
with such endeavors.
VII. CONCLUSION
The burden of proof with regard to contracting authority will
always fall upon the informant with regards to cooperation agree-
ments."' Currently, the only way to assure that an informant
contract is appropriately authorized is first to insist upon a writ-
ten contract outlining compensation arrangements; second, to
129. The court made no determination regarding agent misconduct or upon the
factual question of whether compensation promises were made or not. In fact, "during
their respective depositions, each FBI Special Agent vehemently denied making any
of the promises the plaintiff allege [d]." Id. at 503.
130. Id. at 501.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Doe, 48 Fed. Cl. at 501. See also, City of el Centro, 922 F. 2d at 821; Kania, 227
Ct. Cl. 458, 465; Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947).
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obtain a copy of the most recent DEA Agent's Manual, and, finally,
to request by name that one of the enumerated agents sign the
agreement.
The decision to become an informant entails placing one's life
and limb in danger for some sort of compensation. Whether that
compensation is in the form of a reduced prison term or monetary
reward, the end result is a future filled with fear that those prose-
cuted will seek vengeance. Thus, the decision to become an
informant is one with dire consequences. Such consequences war-
rant well-informed decisions, free of deceitful puffery. Unfortu-
nately, under current policies and regulations, informants will
continue to make decisions based upon information provided by
and subject to only their assigned agent's scruples.
JOAQUIN J. ALEMANY*
* C.P.A., J.D. candidate May 2003, University of Miami School of Law. The
author would like to thank his parents, family and Frances for their love and support.
In addition, the author thanks Professor Donna Coker for her help and insight.
272
